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Abstract
The allocation or assignment of emissions allowances is among the most con-
tentious elements of the design of emissions trading systems. Policy-makers usually
try to satisfy a range of goals through the allocation process, including easing the
transition costs for high-emissions firms, reducing leakage to unregulated regions,
and mitigating the impact of the regulations on product prices such as electricity.
In this paper we develop a detailed representation of the US western electricity
market to assess the potential impacts of various allocation proposals. Several
proposals involve the “updating” of allowance allocation, where the allocation is
tied to the ongoing output of plants. These allocation proposals are designed with
the goals of limiting the pass-through of carbon costs to product prices, mitigat-
ing leakage, and of mitigating the costs to high-emissions firms. However, some
forms of allocation updating can also inflate allowance prices, thereby limiting the
benefits of such schemes to high emissions firms. Thus, the anticipated benefits
from allocation updating can be diluted and further distortions introduced into the
trading system.
(JEL Q50, H23, Q54)
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1 Introduction
As climate change policy in the United States struggles to move from concept to imple-
mentation, there is increasing focus on the details of its implementation. The concept of
capping GHG emissions and allowing trading for compliance remains prominent, although
many details about the design of a cap-and-trade system are still hotly debated. Policy-
makers must often balance equity considerations with the desire to achieve cost-effective
and meaningful reductions in emissions. The differential impacts of GHG regulation
on various industries, regions, and consumers make the design of those regulations very
contentious.
Pending Federal action on climate policy, most of the current initiative has come
from the state or regional level in the United States. The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, a cap-and-trade program which covers the electricity sector of the northeastern
U.S., began operating in 2009. California’s Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32) requires that all
sectors of its economy reduce their aggregate GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. The
California initiative is proceeding in parallel with the broader-based Western Climate
Initiative (WCI). The WCI will establish a regional cap-and-trade program that will
initially encompass large stationary sources (primarily electricity) and then expand to
include other sources, including transportation fuels in a second phase.1
The fact that GHG policy has until recently been driven at the local, rather than
national level, has created concern over the geographic limitations of the regulations.
Environmental targets can be undermined if production is able to shift away from the
jurisdictional reach of the regulator through either leakage or reshuﬄing of production
sources.2 These concerns over regional US policies reflect similar, more general concerns
with leakage as a challenge even for international climate agreements. In the crafting
of European CO2 market, as well as the Waxman-Markey bill that would establish a
national cap in the United States, much attention has been paid to the “competitiveness”
question, which is fundamentally related to how vulnerable domestic producers are to
leakage from imports.
Because of this, a significant fraction of the implementation efforts have been devoted
to policies and design choices that can mitigate this leakage problem. The choice of
the level of the supply chain at which emissions are measured and regulations applied,
known as the “point of regulation,” can play a role in limiting the circumvention of the
regulations, although previous analysis has argued that these benefits can be overstated
and that other efficiency problems can be created.3 Here, we focus on the impact of
1see WCI (2008).
2See Bushnell, et. al (2008), Fowlie (2009), and Chen (2009).
3See the recommendations of the Market Advisory Committee to the California Air Resources Board
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alternative allocation proposals on market performance. This question is also relevant
at the international level as current proposals for a US cap-and-trade rely heavily upon
allocation mechanisms to blunt the impact of the regulation on competitive trade-exposed
industries.
In this paper, we develop a detailed model of the power sector in the western United
States, and examine the impacts of alternative cap-and-trade designs on the operations,
emissions, and prices in this region. Our research is motivated by several important eco-
nomic and policy questions relating to cap-and-trade design. First, there is the practical
question of just how severe leakage can be in regional electricity markets where only some
member states regulate CO2. Obviously the more states that participate, the less severe
the potential for leakage may be, but we hope to quantify those risks by examining the
benefits of expansion from California to the rest of the WCI. Second, we focus on current
policy debates over cap-and-trade design to examine the general relationships between
specific design elements and market outcomes such as leakage and overall market effi-
ciency. Specifically, we focus on the question of the allocation of allowances through
“updating,” a policy that links allocation to ongoing production. This approach ap-
pears in various forms in every major CO2 market under consideration. Last, we provide
some quantitative, but necessarily qualified, estimates of the impacts of cap-and-trade
on allowance and power prices in the western U.S.
We find that leakage of electricity production to unregulated regions is a signifi-
cant concern, even under the expanded WCI program. One of the key design elements
under consideration is the allocation of emissions allowances through updating. The
environmental economics literature often focuses on “output-based” updating, which
ties allocation of allowances to quantities of product produced. Our results show that
output-based updating substantially reduces leakage, and produces relatively low elec-
tricity prices compared to an exogenous form of allocation, such as auctioning. Much
of the allocation seen in practice, however, either explicitly or implicitly benchmarks
the output-based allocations to the emissions intensity of an industry or group of firms.
Further when an output-based allocation is applied to multiple industries, it is common
to normalize output-based allocations according to an industry standard benchmark of
the carbon intensity of production. This approach plays a prominent role in recent U.S.
legislative proposals for capping GHG emissions.4 While an obvious metric for compar-
ing output across industries, by normalizing allocations according to emissions intensity
output-based updating can take on characteristics of emissions-based updating. In the
western electricity context, benchmarking has drawn supporters because of the view that
(2007), Burtraw (2008), Chen, et al., (2010).
4Both the American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454) and the American Power Act
(“Kerry-Lieberman”) emphasize output-based updating for allocation to energy intensive and trade
exposed industries.
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it can help ease the transition to carbon regulation by allocating disproportionately more
allowances to relatively high carbon producers, as well as limit the allowance windfall
that may be reaped by a low carbon producer under a purely output-based scheme.
However as we demonstrate in the context of the WCI market, benchmarking, or equiva-
lently, “fuel-based” updating in fact reverses some of the effects seen under output-based
updating. One implication of these results is that, while updating is in part motivated
by a desire to provide financial relief to carbon intensive firms, it can in fact leave high
polluting firms only modestly better off than if all the allowances were auctioned. At the
same time, updating can introduce significant distortions into the abatement decisions
of firms and industries.
2 Design and Modeling of Cap-and-Trade Markets
As is necessarily the case with markets that are created by regulatory fiat, the choices
made by regulators in designing those markets go a long way toward influencing their
outcomes. This is certainly true in the case of cap-and-trade (C&T) markets for the
trading of emissions compliance obligations. Such markets exist because regulators create
a form of property right, emissions allowances, and induce a demand for those allowances
through the setting of the emissions cap. Not surprisingly, the distribution or allocation
of those valuable allowances is often a source of great contention.5
Traditionally, the allocation of allowences has been held to be an issue limited to
economic transfers that need not affect the efficiency of the resulting emissions trading
market. Certainly it is the equity concerns that dominate the discussions and debates
amongst policymakers and the affected industries. The impacts on efficiency can be
negligible if the allocation is truly exogenous to the ongoing operations of the industries
subject to the emissions cap, as is the case with the US SO2 trading program (Ellerman,
et al., 2000). However, in many cases the allocation of emissions allowances has either
been endogenous, or contingent upon market outcomes.
One proposal that has been of increasing interest is to allocate emissions allowances
using output-based updating. Under output-based updating each firm receives an allo-
cation of emissions allowances that is proportional to its total product production. In
the electricity context, for example, this means each firm receives an allocation that is
proportional to the MWh generated within the regulatory jurisdiction.6 The effects of
5See, for example Kanter and Mouawad, 2008.
6We use the term generated somewhat loosely here, as in the California and WCI context, the point
of regulation is mixed. Emissions from sources within the cap-and-trade region will be regulated along
the lines of traditional source-based cap-and-trade systems. In additions imports into the cap-and-trade
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output-based updating have been a subject of much research.7 In general, it is believed
that output-based updating would help to mitigate leakage, as firms would be rewarded
(in the form of allowances) for domestic production. Output-based updating is also
widely believed to result in lower product prices than alternative forms of allocation.
While one strain of the academic literature has focused on the detrimental efficiency
effects of such a price impact, it has an appeal to regulators. For example, the design
recommendations of both the California Public Utilities Commission and the WCI include
the minimization of the impacts of carbon regulations on consumers as a prominent
objective of the allocation process. Despite the appeal of the product price effect, these
“lower” prices can lead to inefficient over-consumption as the externality cost of the
pollution is not reflected in product prices.8 It is interesting to note, however, that in a
general equilibrium setting, the welfare effects of minimizing the product price impacts
are more ambiguous.9
Further, there is a concern that output-based updating, if applied symmetrically to
all producers (or at least to all fossil-fueled producers), would exacerbate equity concerns.
For example, there is a fear that low-carbon producers will experience a “windfall” under
output-based allocation, while high-carbon producers will suffer most of the cost impacts
of GHG regulations. This is because output-based allocation favors cleaner producers.
They are rewarded for production, and penalized for emissions. Traditionally, allocation
has been used as a tool to “soften the blow” of increased environmental compliance
through allocations based upon historic emissions patterns, also known as grandfathered
allocations. Under grandfathered allocation, larger polluters receive a larger share of the
allocations, while also paying more for compliance due to their higher emissions levels.
In this way the total costs to high-emissions producers are mitigated, while the marginal
cost of compliance remains the same. The California Public Utilities Commission has
recommended (CPUC, 2008) an alternative we will refer to as “fuel-based” updating
in order to address this equity concern. Under fuel-based updating, the allocation of
emissions allowances per MWh of generation would be higher for high-carbon (e.g., coal-
region will also be regulated under a system known as the “first-deliverer.” In effect the importer of
the product will be required to surrender emissions allowances equivalent to the emissions required to
produce that product, even though the production itself occurs physically outside of the cap-and-trade
region. Under first-deliverer, the importers would also be eligible for allocations under an updating
scheme. These allocations would be proportional to the MWh imported into the cap-and-trade region.
7see Jensen and Rasmussen (2000), and Fischer and Fox (2007), Fischer (2010)
8See Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn (2005) for a discussion of the various impacts of updating.
9This is because the price impacts of the environmental regulation may exacerbate the negative
impacts of other existing taxes and regulations. Although there has been considerable focus on using
the revenues from environmental regulations to offset these distortions (see Goulder, Parry and Burtraw
(1997), and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001)) it is possible that minimizing the price impact on the regulated
products could also work in the same direction.
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based) producers than it would be for low-carbon (e.g., gas-based) producers.
Fuel-based updating is part of a general class of allocation approaches that utilize
benchmarking at an industry or process level. It is in fact more common than “pure”
output-based allocation in practice. This is in part due to the equity concerns described
above, and also due to the fact that it is not always easy to either measure or compare the
“output” of some plants, particularly in C&T programs that span multiple industries.
Some states participating in the US NOx budget program utilize a form of benchmarking
that is based upon the heat-input of power plants. Allocations the ETS market for CO2
in the European Union have contained, at least implicitly, several aspects of updating.
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006, Ahman, et al., 2006). It is also expected that updating will
play a significant role in the emerging US national cap-and-trade legislation.
The analysis of updating proposals has focused on the efficiency implications of these
approaches. In addition to inefficient over-consumption, updating can result in a produc-
tive inefficiency by distorting relative production decisions, as well as distort long-term
investment signals.10 Several papers have examined the interaction of allocation policy
with leakage and efficiency for specific industries, including electricity (Neuhoff, Martinez,
and Sato (2006)) and cement (Demailly and Quirion (2006)).
However, these papers tend not to emphasize the aspects of updating that motivate
their application in practice. These are the impacts of updating on allowance and prod-
uct prices, as well as the equity effects for firms. Using a theoretical model, Bohringer
and Lange (2005) consider a “closed” trading system where the cap is fixed and there
is no opportunity for trading with other emissions markets. When allocations are ex-
actly proportional (but not equivalent) to emissions, updating recreates the “first-best”
product prices and emissions of auctioning. The allowance prices, however, rise in a
closed system. This is because emissions-based allocation reduces the perceived marginal
rate of emissions for firms. In order to achieve the reductions required by the cap, al-
lowance prices must rise to offset this perceived discounting of emissions rates. Although
higher-emissions firms receive larger allocations, they pay disproportionately more for
the emissions that are not covered by allocation, due to the higher equilibrium allowance
prices. In an “open” trading system, the effect of updating tends to push the abatement
to regions or industries that are not receiving the implicit production subsidies in the
form of updated allowance allocations.
The western market we examine here has characteristics of both closed and open
systems. The allocation rules are aimed at market shares, and therefore the industry
level cap would not change with allocation results. In the initial years of the WCI,
when the allocated shares will be the largest, emissions will be dominated by the electric
10See Jensen and Rasmussen (2000), Ahman and Holmstrom (2006), and Sterner and Muller (2008)
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sector. As mentioned before, however, leakage is also a concern. There will therefore be
opportunities for trading product, if not emissions allowances with neighboring regions.
The goal of this paper is to try to sort through these factors and establish the relative
impacts of them on market outcomes.
2.1 Analysis of Cap-and-Trade Design
For the most part, empirical projections of cap-and-trade markets for GHG have tended
to take the “long-view” approach of simulating outcomes 10 to 20 years in the future. The
studies commissioned by the regulatory agencies responsible for implementing California’s
AB 32, for example, emphasize the year 2020 (see discussion of the E3 model in CPUC
(2008)). As such this work tends to be focused on the important assumptions one must
make about the trajectory of future electricity demand and trends in the investment of
new generation technologies. Chen et al. (2008) examine the economic and emissions
implications of the three C&T proposals considered under AB32: source-, load- based
and first-seller. When cross-boarder electricity sales are subject to an emissions cap, they
show that these three proposals produce the same market outcomes, and all of them are
prone to emissions leakage. None of these studies consider how outcomes might change
under different allocation schemes.
Because of our focus on the specific design of the cap-and-trade mechanism, and
its impact on the operation of electricity markets, we instead take the “near-view” ap-
proach. We base our analysis upon actual market data drawn from the year 2007, and
look at the counter-factual question of how those markets would have functioned under
a cap-and-trade regime. In this sense the work follows in the spirit of Fowlie (2008),
who also studies the potential for leakage from a California-only market, and also that
of Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008) who deploy similar techniques to examine com-
petition and vertical contracting issues. In a fashion similar to Schuliken, et al., (2008),
we formulate the joint equilibrium outcomes of the emissions and electricity market as a
linear-complementarity problem.
Our study differs from previous work in several important ways. While Fowlie and
the E3 study employ an empirical model of portions of the western electricity market,
we model the emissions allowance prices as endogenous to the cap-and-trade market.
This is central to our work given our focus on the endogenous impact of allocation
policies on allowance prices. Second, in addition to California’s CO2 policies, we examine
the broader western market proposed under the WCI. Last, we explicitly consider how
allocation policies can affect firm behavior in the western US. Previous work examining
the impacts of allocation have either taken a general equilibrium approach (Bohringer
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and Lange (2005), Sterner and Muller (2008), Fischer and Fox (2008), or more complex
formulations applied to stylized market data (Shuliken, et al., 2008, Neuhoff, et al., 2006).
We also take a different approach than most similar analyses to developing our market
elements used for the simulation. One difficulty with simulating electricity markets in a
high level of detail is that, while data on most fossil-fuel based generation units is quite
extensive and reliable, there are far less data on the activities of hydro-electric plants,
renewable generation, and the substantial amount of power generated from combined
heat & power or “cogeneration” plants. When building a counter-factual recreation of
an electricity market, these data gaps make assumptions about the missing production
necessary.
We take the approach of restricting our construction of a counter-factual market
outcome to the portion of resources for which we do have detailed data. In effect we
are assuming that, under our counter-factual, the operations of non-modeled generation
plants would not have changed. This is equivalent to assuming that compliance with
the carbon reduction goals of a cap-and-trade program will be achieved through the
reallocation of production within the set of modeled plants. We believe that this is a
reasonable assumption for two reasons. First the vast majority of the carbon emissions
from this sector come from these modeled resources. Indeed, data availability is tied to
emissions levels since the data are reported through environmental compliance to existing
regulations. Second, the total production from “clean” sources is unlikely to change in
the short-run. The production of low carbon electricity is driven by natural resource
availability (e.g., rain, wind, solar) or, in the case of combined heat and power (CHP),
to non-electricity production decisions. The economics of production are such that these
sources are already producing all the power they can, even without additional carbon
regulation. To a first-order, short-run emissions reductions will have to come either from
shifting production from among conventional sources, a reduction in end-use electricity
demand, or through substitution with unregulated imports, i.e., leakage or reshuﬄing.11
3 Model
In this section, we first describe our equilibrium model and then discuss how we apply
data from various sources to arrive at our calculations.
11It is important to recognize that our modeling approach not only assumes that existing zero-carbon
sources will not change how much they produce but also when they produce it. An interesting question
is whether a redistribution of hydro-electric power across time could lower carbon emissions by enabling
a better management of fossil generation sources. Such an analysis would require a co-optimization of
hydro and thermal electric production and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Although this simulation approach is capable of representing imperfect competition
in the product market (i.e., electricity) we assume here that firms act in a manner
consistent with perfect competition with regards to both the electricity and emissions
allowance markets.12 We still model these markets as a series of equilibrium conditions
for each of the individual firms represented, as the incentive effects on individual firms
from policies such as updating are still relevant here.
The key variables and parameters of the model are grouped according to four impor-
tant indices; the firm, location, technology, and time period of production. The total
production of firm i from generation technology j, and location l at time t is represented
by qij,l,t. Total emissions by firm and technology are denoted e
i
j,l(q
i
j,l,t). We assume that
marginal emissions rates can be increasing in quantity (ei′j,l ≥ 0), but are unchanging over
time. Production costs Cij,l(q
i
j,l,t) vary by firm, technology, and location, and as described
below are assumed to be quadratic in output qij,l,t.
For each firm i ∈ {1, ..., N} and time period t ∈ {0, ..., T}, a perfectly competitive,
or cost-minimizing firm i maximizes profits for all its technologies j and locations l over
periods 0, ..., T :
pii(q
i
j,l,t) =
∑
t
∑
l
∑
j
[pl,t · qij,l,t − Cil,j(qij,l,t)] · r−t −
∑
t
∑
l∈REG
∑
j
λt · eij,l(qij,l,t) · r−t, (1)
where r is the discount rate and pl,t and λt are the wholesale prices of electricity and
CO2 allowances in period t, respectively. Allowance prices are assumed to be uniform
across the regulated (capped) region. Wholesale electricity is assumed to be a homoge-
nous commodity for purposes of setting wholesale prices, although prices are assumed
to vary by location subject to transmission constraints as described below. However,
electricity production falls into two categories, that within the region covered by the
emissions cap and that outside the reach of the regulation. The set REG represents
those plants located inside the cap and trade region.
In practice, the above model would be part of a larger multi-period cycle of emissions
compliance and allocation. As we describe in section 3.3, the first order conditions of 1
are explicitly related to variables in period t as well as allowance prices in t+1. In effect,
the allocations are given out at the end of the cycle, just before allowances are required
to be surrendered. This suggests that a simplified two-period representation is sufficient
12Although the California market was notorious for its high degree of market power in the early part
of this decade, competitiveness has dramatically improved in the years since the California crisis, while
the vast majority of supply in rest of the WECC remains regulated under traditional cost-of-service
principles.
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to capture the key qualitative impacts of updating on the incentives of firms.13 In the
following section, we therefore represent the allocation decision as part of a “closed-loop,”
to a single cap-and-trade compliance cycle by applying the Hotelling rule, which requires
allowance prices to grow in commensurate with interest rate. The same approach has
also used elsewhere (see Rubin (1996)). These allocations are then linked to the actual
output of producers during the compliance cycle that is about to conclude. We therefore
suppress the effect of interest rates or other dynamic considerations. In this and other
ways, our analysis should be considered a view of the short-run impacts of these policies.
It should also be noted that we do not consider the incentives effects on investment in
new generation capacity. While these incentives may be important considerations in
some context we note that current proposals for updating allocations in California and
the WCI are designed to sunset relatively quickly and there are no specific provisions to
include new facilities in the updating process. Because of these factors we believe that
the short-run incentive effects are likely to dominate long-run effects.
3.1 Cap-and-Trade Design
The profit function described in the previous section assumes a standard source-based
cap-and-trade market, where the compliance obligation rests explicitly on the producer
(in this case the electricity generator). As the focus of C&T design turned to allocation,
however, much of the regulatory emphasis was devoted to mitigating consumer prices,
smoothing the cost impacts to firms (at least somewhat), and mitigating the “windfall”
profits that might be earned by low-carbon producers (CPUC (2008)). These goals
were to be addressed primarily through allocation policies. In particular, two specific
alternative implementations of output-based updating are considered here.
3.1.1 Output-based Updating
As discussed above, one mechanism that can depress product market prices and at least
partially combat leakage is output-based updating. In this context, the allocation of
emissions allowances would be tied to the electricity production of firms. Each MWh of
production would earn a fraction of an emissions allowance.
Following this assumption, we can rewrite the profit maximization problem for each
firm to include the prospect of output-based allocation of emissions allowances. Let
δt · qij,l,t be the allocation of emissions allowances earned for use in the compliance cycle
13See Hagem and Wetskog (2008) apply a similar two-period setting to study cost-effectiveness of
intertemporal emissions trading.
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t+ 1...T from producing qij,l,t units of electricity in regulated region l during period t.
Note that we assume that the overall cap does not change from period to period, only that
the distribution of (zero-cost) emissions allowances across firms varies with the relative
output of firms and their facilities. In other words δt = δ˜
CAP
Qt
. where Qt is the aggregate
production (market demand) in period t, δ˜ is the overall fraction of allowances that are
allocated through updating, and t ∈ 0...T is the cycle of the compliance period. Thus, the
program of output-based updating would not take the form of a “tradable performance
standard.”14 Under a performance standard, the subsidy for output is not limited by
an overall cap. Even if the performance standard were a regulatory mandate, rather
than an allocation of emissions allowances, there is an implicit subsidy of production.
Compliance with a mandate, when specified as an intensity per unit of output, can be
advanced both through limiting the undesirable input and expanding total output.15
The profit for firm i will now include consideration of the additional allowances earned
from additional production:
pii,t(q
i
j,l,t) =
∑
l
∑
j
[pl,t · qij,l,t − Cil,j(qij,l,t)]−
∑
l∈REG
∑
j
[λt · eij,l(qij,l,t)−
λt+1
r
· δt · qij,l,t]. (2)
This profit equation highlights how the updating weakens the marginal cost impact of
the cap-and-trade requirement for a given allowance price, λt+1. Equation (2) can then
be simplified by λt =
λt+1
r
when applying the Hotelling rule:
pii,t(q
i
j,l,t) =
∑
l
∑
j
[pl,t · qij,l,t − Cil,j(qij,l,t)]−
∑
l∈REG
∑
j
λt[·eij,l(qij,l,t)− δt · qij,l,t]. (3)
For facilities with an average emissions rate higher than the allocation rate, the cap-
and-trade still effectively taxes output, although at a lower rate. For facilities with an
average emissions rate that is lower than the allocation rate,
eij,l(q
i
j,l,t)
qi
j,l,t
< δt, there is now
a production subsidy.
3.1.2 Fuel-based Updating
The other approach to updating under consideration would distinguish between the in-
puts of various production sources. Motivated by a desire to limit the cost impacts of
14See Fischer, 2003.
15See Fullerton and Heutel (2007). One current proposal that exhibits this characteristic is the “low
carbon fuel standard” for transportation fuels (see Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2008)).
11
cap-and-trade on utilities heavily reliant on coal-based sources of power, this proposal
would allocate emissions allowances to generation from differing fuel sources in a ratio
roughly aligned with the average GHG emission rate from each fuel source. In the no-
tation of our model, this approach would provide δj,t emissions allowances to each MWh
of generation from a source of technology type j. In other words, each technology could
in theory be subject to a separate allocation ratio. The resulting equilibrium condition
for production for firm i would be
pii,t(q
i
j,l,t) =
∑
l
∑
j
[pl,t · qij,l,t − Cil,j(qij,l,t)]−
∑
l∈REG
∑
j
[λt · eij,l(qij,l,t)−
λt+1
r
· δj,t · qij,l,t]. (4)
As with the output-based allocation, the allocation component δj,t weakens the impact
of allowance prices on the perceived marginal cost of production. The strength of this
effect is now asymmetric with respect to fuel types, and its net impact will depend upon
the specific value of δj,t. The general intent of the fuel-based updating is to weaken the
impact on higher emission technologies and therefore soften the blow of implementing
the cap. A somewhat extreme version of this allocation would arise if emissions rates
within each technology class were constant and equivalent across all firms and locations
(i.e., eij,l
′ = e˜j) and the allocation factors were applied proportionately to emission rates
δj = δ˜ · e˜j. If we also assume that the Hotelling rule applies to allowance valuation, and
λt =
λt+1
r
, then equation (4) can be rewritten as
pii,t(q
i
j,l,t) =
∑
l
∑
j
[pl,t · qij,l,t − Cil,j(qij,l,t)]− λt(1− δ˜)
∑
l∈REG
∑
j
qij,l,t · e˜j. (5)
Note that (5) is essentially equivalent to equation (1), again assuming that emissions
rates are constant over technologies and firms, except for the fact that the allowance price
has now been scaled by 1− δ˜ for all firms. The Bohringer and Lange (2005) result implies
that in a closed cap-and-trading system this results in the same outcomes that would be
produced by a grandfathered allocation of allowances, except for the fact that allowance
prices are increased by 1/(1 − δ˜). In this paper we examine the impact of this kind of
updating in a much more complex production environment, with leakage, transmission,
and capacity constraints. In addition, the actual updating policies proposed for the WCI
do not reach the level of perfectly matching emissions rates, although some would come
close. As the updating policy moves toward better correlation with emissions rates, we
would expect these effects to become more pronounced. An empirical analysis such as
this one is necessary to determine exactly how pronounced these impacts would be.
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3.2 Transmission Network Management
We assume that the transmission network is managed efficiently in a manner that pro-
duces results equivalent to those reached through centralized locational marginal pricing
(LMP). For our purposes this means that the transmission network is utilized to efficiently
arbitrage price differences across locations, subject to the limitations of the transmission
network. Such arbitrage could be achieved through either bilateral transactions or a
more centralized operation of the network. For now we simply assume that this arbitrage
condition is achieved.
Mathematically, we adopt an approach utilized by Metzler,et al. (2003), to represent
the arbitrage conditions as another set of constraints of the market equilibrium. Under
the assumptions of a DC load-flow model, the transmission ‘flow’ induced by a marginal
injection of power at location l can be represented by a power transfer distribution factor
PTDFlk, which maps injections at locations, l, to flows over individual transmission paths
k. Within this framework, the arbitrage condition will implicitly inject and consume
power, yl,t to maximize available and feasible arbitrage profits as defined by
∑
l 6=h
(ph,t − pl,t) yl,t.
In the above arbitrage equation, the location h is the arbitrarily assigned “hub”
location from which all relative transmission flows are defined. Thus an injection of
power, yl,t ≥ 0, at location l is assumed to be withdrawn at h. This arbitrage condition
is subject to the flow limits on the transmission network, particularly the line capacities,
Tk.
−T k ≤ PTDFl,k · yl,t ≤ T k
This combination of arbitrage pressure and physical transmission constraints are re-
solved in the solution to the following langrangian.
max
yl,t
∑
l 6=h
[
(ph,t − pl,t) yl,t −
(
PTDFl,k · yl,t − T k
)
τk,t
]
.
Where τk,t is the shadow value of capacity on transmission path k at time t.
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3.3 Equilibrium Conditions
Each firm has a limited capacity of each technology type in each location, which we
denote by qij,l. Given the above framework, we can represent the resulting equilibrium
as the set of quantities that simultaneously satisfy the following first order conditions.
We represent as a complementarity condition, where the symbol ⊥ signifies that vectors
x, y ≥ 0 and xTy = 0. For each firm i and period t:
qij,l,t ≥ 0 ⊥ pt − Ci′l,j(qij,l,t)− λt · ei′j,l(qij,l,t)− γij,l,t ≤ 0 ∀i, j, t, l ∈ REG. (6)
and
qij,l,t ≥ 0 ⊥ pt − Ci′l,j(qij,l,t)− γij,l,t ≤ 0 ∀ i, j, t, l /∈ REG. (7)
Here γij,l,t is the shadow value of the capacity constraint on technology q
i
j,l,t.
γij,l,t ≥ 0 ⊥ qij,l − qij,t ≥ 0 ∀ i, j, t, l. (8)
Each firm, taking prices as exogenous, sets its production so that marginal costs equal
the price at the location of the production. This marginal cost component includes the
costs of emissions allowances in locations subject to the emissions cap as well as the
shadow price of the limited capacity of that technology.
Output-based Updating
As described above, output-based updating would allocate δt allowances per MWh to
each firm. Differentiating the profit function (2) yields the following.
qij,l,t ≥ 0 ⊥ pt − Ci′l,j(qij,l,t)− λt · (ei′j,l,t(qij,l,t)− δt)− γij,l,t ≤ 0 ∀ i, j, t, l ∈ REG. (9)
If the updating is instead fuel or technology specific, then the above condition is
modified so that the allocation quantity, now δj,t, can be unique to a technology type j.
qij,l,t ≥ 0 ⊥ pt − Ci′l,j(qij,t)− λt · (ei′j,l,t(qij,l,t)− δj,t)− γij,l,t ≤ 0 ∀ i, j, t, l ∈ REG. (10)
Environmental Constraint
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Along with equilibrium conditions (6) - (10), the equilibrium for a combined electricity
and emissions market will include the following condition defining the allowance price for
the overall compliance period.
λt ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
i
∑
j
∑
l∈REG
qij,l,t · eij,l,t(qij,l,t)− eMAX ≤ 0. (11)
Where, again, the symbol⊥ signifies complementarity between the constraint on available
emissions allowances and the allowance price, which is the shadow price of that constraint.
If there are excess emissions allowances, the price is zero; otherwise λt is positive.
Network Constraints
Prices at individual locations will be determined by the production decisions of firms
and the flows over the transmission network. The arbitrage minimization assumption
described above produces the following condition.
ph,t − pl,t −
∑
k
PTDFl,k · τl,t = 0.
This reflects the general condition from an efficiently utilized network, that the prices
between locations differ only by the additional costs of congestion of a shipment between
those locations, as measured by the flows over lines times their shadow prices. There is
a separate condition for potential congestion in each direction.
τ 1k,t ≥ 0 ⊥PTDFl,k · yl,t − T k ≤ 0 ∀k, t.
τ 2k,t ≥ 0 ⊥T k − PTDFl,k · yl,t ≤ 0 ∀k, t.
When the inverse demand, marginal cost, and emissions functions are linear, as they
are described below, the equilibrium conditions for each of the possible cap-and-trade
regimes, along with the respective conditions for network operations and emissions market
balance, combine to form a linear complementarity problem (Cottle, Pang, and Stone
(1992)) with variables qij,l,t, yl,t and dual values τk,t, λt, and γ
i
j,l,t ≥ 0. The solution to
this complementarity problem constitutes a perfectly competitive equilibrium to this
market, subject to the respective definitions of the cap region and allocation policy. Using
the data sources and functional forms described in the following section, we calculate
these equilibrium outcomes using the PATH solver algorithm (Dirske and Ferris, 1995)
implemented through the AMPL math programming language.
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4 Data Sources and Assumptions
Our primary data source is the BASECASE dataset from Platts, which is in turn derived
primarily from the continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS) utilized by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to monitor the emissions of large stationary
sources. Almost all large fossil-fired electricity generation sources are included in this
dataset. However, hydro-electric, renewable, and some small fossil generation sources are
missing. The CEMS reports hourly data on several aspects of production and emissions.
Hourly data on nuclear generation plants are included with fossil generation data in the
BASECASE dataset. Here we utilize the hourly generation output and carbon emissions
for available facilities.
These hourly output data are aggregated by firm and region to develop the “demand”
in the simulation model. As described above, this is in fact a residual demand; the de-
mand that is left after applying the output from non-CEMS plants. Plant cost, capacity,
and availability characteristics and regional fuel prices are then taken from the Platts
POWERDAT dataset. These data are in turn derived from mandatory industry reporting
to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the National Electric Reliability
Council (NERC).
These data are then combined to create a demand profile and supply functions for
periods in the simulation. Although hourly data are available, for computational reasons
we aggregate these data into representative time periods. There are 20 such periods
for each of the four seasons, yielding 80 explicitly modeled time periods. As California
policy was the original focus of this work, the aggregation of hourly data was based
upon a sorting of the California residual demand. California aggregate production was
sorted into 20 bins based upon equal MW spreads between the minimum and maximum
production levels observed in the 2007 sample year. A time period in the simulation
therefore is based upon the mean of the relevant market data for all actual 2007 data
that fall within the bounds of each bin. For example, every actual hour (there were 54)
during Spring 2007 in which California residual demand fell between 6949 and 7446 MW
were combined into a single representative hour for simulation purposes. The resulting
emissions from this hour were then multiplied by 54 to generate an annualized equivalent
total level of emissions.
The number of season-hour observations in each bin is therefore unbalanced, there are
relatively few observations in the highest and lowest production levels, and more closer
to the median levels. The demand levels used in the simulation are then based upon the
mean production levels observed in each bin. In order to calculate aggregate emissions,
the resulting outputs for each simulated demand level was multiplied by the number of
actual market hours used to produce the input for that simulated demand level.
16
Table 1: Demand by Region and Season
Season AZNM CA NWPP non-WCI
Winter 10925 11641 10781 16407
Spring 12130 11369 8394 15604
Summer 14705 16314 12823 18766
Fall 10943 13504 12878 16622
In the following sub-sections, we describe further the assumptions and functional
forms utilized in the simulation.
4.1 Market Demand
End-use consumption in each location is represented by the demand function Ql,t =
αl,t − βlpl,t, yielding an inverse demand curve defined as
plt =
αl,t −∑i,j qi,j,t − yi,t
βl
where yi,t is the aggregate net transmission flow into location l. The intercept of the
demand function is based upon the actual production levels in each location calculated
as described above. The mean hourly demand is summarized by GHG regulatory region
in Table 1.16 In each representative hour, demand is assumed to be at the levels reflected
in Table 1 when market prices are equal to the levels observed in the actual market hours
from which the demand numbers are taken. In other words, we model a linear demand
curve that passes through the observed price-quantity pairs for each period. As electricity
is an extremely inelastic product, we utilize an extremely low value for the slopes of this
demand curve. For each region, the regional slope of the demand curve is set so that the
median elasticity in each region is -.05.17
16As described below, supply and demand regions can be characterized as belonging in one of 5
electrical zones or one of the four zones distinguished by climate regulation listed in Table 1.
17When the market is modeled as perfectly competitive, as it is here, the results are relatively insensi-
tive to the elasticity assumption, as price is set at the marginal cost of system production and the range
of prices is relatively modest.
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4.2 Fossil-Fired Generation Costs and Emissions
We explicitly model the major fossil-fired thermal units in each electric system. Because
of the legacy of cost-of-service regulation, relatively reliable data on the production costs
of thermal generation units are available. The cost of fuel comprises the major component
of the marginal cost of thermal generation. The marginal cost of a modeled generation
unit is estimated to be the sum of its direct fuel, CO2, and variable operation and
maintenance (VO&M) costs. Fuel costs can be calculated by multiplying the price of
fuel, which varies by region, by a unit’s ‘heat rate,’ a measure of its fuel-efficiency.
The capacity of a generating unit is reduced to reflect the probability of a forced outage
of each unit. The available capacity of generation unit i, is taken to be (1− fofi) ∗ capi,
where capi is the summer rated capacity of the unit and fofi is the forced outage factor
reflecting the probability of the unit being completely down at any given time.18 Unit
forced outage factors are taken from the generator availability data system (GADS) data
that is collected by the North American Reliability Councils. These data aggregate
generator outage performance by technology, age, and region.
Generation marginal costs are derived from the costs of fuel and variable operating
and maintenance costs for each unit in our sample. Platts provides a unit average heat-
rate for each of these units. These heat-rates are multiplied by a regional average fuel
cost for each fuel and region, also taken from Platts. Costs for each technology type are
then aggregated by firm and region, and then represented with a single quadratic function
for each of five technology types, further separated by firm and region. Marginal cost of
technology j at location l for firm i is therefore an affine function.
Ci′l,j(q
i
j,l,t) = k
i
l,j + c
i
l,jq
i
l,j,t
These cost functions are derived by aggregating the generation of each firm by re-
gion and technology type. The five technology categories are coal, gas combined cycle
(CCGT), conventional (steam) gas, gas combustion turbine (CT), and oil.
There are ten firms consisting of the nine largest fossil generation producers and a
“fringe” firm derived from the aggregation of the generation from all remaining firms.
The generation capacity of each of these firms is summarized by technology type in Table
2.
Emissions Rates
18This approach to modeling unit availability is similar to Wolfram (1999) and Bushnell, Mansur and
Saravia (2008).
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Table 2: Generation by Ownership and Fuel Type
Firm Coal CCGT Gas St Gas CT Oil
BRKA 6104 629 235 319 0
CPN 0 4802 0 915 0
DYN 0 2120 2875 0 0
EIX 720 1373 0 237 0
LADWP 2117 1303 1929 282 0
PW 1741 1569 430 486 0
SALTRP 1802 1537 407 0 0
SEMPRA 0 2366 0 46 0
XCEL 2593 690 107 0 0
Others 14153 16338 12049 4840 629
Emissions rates are based upon the fuel-efficiency (heat-rate) of a plant and the carbon
intensity of the fuel burned by that plant. They are modeled as affine functions, with
rates differentiated by firm, location, and technology. This yields a functional form of
ei′l,j(q
i
l,j,t) = E
i
l,j + 
i
l,jq
i
l,j,t.
4.3 Transmission Network
Our regional markets are highly aggregated geographically. The region we model is the
electricity market contained within the U.S. portion of the Western Electricity Coor-
dinating Council (WECC). The WECC is the organization responsible for coordinating
the planning investment, and general operating procedures of electricity networks in most
states west of the Missisipi. The multiple sub-networks, or control areas, contained within
this region are aggregated into the four “sub-regions.” Between (and within) these re-
gions are over 50 major transmission interfaces, or paths. Due to both computational and
data considerations, we have aggregated this network into a simplified, 5 region network
consisting primarily of the 4 major subregions.19 Figure 1 illustrates the areas covered
by these regions. The states in white, plus California, constitute the US participants in
the WCI.
19The final “node” in the network consists of the Intermountain power plant in Utah. This plant is
connected to southern California by a high-capacity DC line, and is often considered to electrically be
part of California. Because under some regulatory scenarios, it would not in fact be part of California
for GHG purposes, it is represented as a separate location that connects directly to California.
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Given aggregated level of the network, we model the relative impedance of each set
of major pathways as roughly inverse to their voltage levels. The network connecting
AZNM and the NWPP to CA is higher voltage (500 KV) than the predominantly 345
KV network connecting the other regions. For our purposes, we assume that these lower
voltage paths yield 5/3 the impedance of the direct paths to CA.
Figure 1: Western Regional Network and Cap-and-Trade Regions
There are sub-regions with both the NWPP and AZNM areas that would also not be
subject to the currently organized WCI agreement. These include the states of Nevada
and Idaho, as well as power plants located on tribal lands in the desert southwest. In
each case these regions were considered to electrically be part of the region in which they
were located, but for purposes of GHG regulation were treated as separate regions.
The flow capacity over the regional interfaces are ideally based upon the amount of
“slack” capacity remaining over these interfaces under actual market conditions. We have
obtained data from the WECC for hourly flows and total available capacity for each hour
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Table 3: Available Slack Transmission Capacity by Region and Period (MW)
Season Period NW-CA SW-CA RM-NW RM-SW SW-NW
Off-peak 5649 3023 731 523 709
Spring
Peak 3692 2855 837 505 772
Off-peak 2886 3320 935 490 762
Summer
Peak 1634 3337 957 451 922
Off-peak 5012 2604 540 369 402
Fall
Peak 3101 2757 652 318 666
Off-peak 5473 2362 458 278 319
Winter
Peak 3683 1921 545 231 396
of the first 10 months of 2007. Unfortunately data for November and December 2007
were not yet available.
We characterize the available additional capacity over the key paths according to the
average difference between available capacity (or ATC) and actual flows over each key
transmission path. These differences are averaged over peak and off-peak periods for
each of the four seasons represented in our model, where the winter season is based on
the average of October only.20 The resulting available remaining import capacity over
each transmission interface is summarized in Table 3.
5 Results
Following the assumptions described above, we simulate the electricity production for the
western electricity market under a variety of assumptions about the scope and design of
cap-and-trade for CO2. For the geographic scope of the regulation, we first simulate op-
erations under no-cap at all to establish a reference level for the other simulation results.
Then we examine CO2 caps applied to California-only, to all (US) states participating
in the WCI, and finally to all states (and tribal areas) in the western market. For each
20In implementing our model, “off-peak” hours are defined as falling in the lowest 6 out of 20 of
demand ‘bins’ that are described above. All other hours are treated as “on-peak”.
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of these cap-and-trade scenarios, we assume that the cap is set at 85% of the CO2 emis-
sions from the “no-cap” scenario. For all of the results in this section, we assume that
allowances are allocated exogenously and therefore do not effect the output decisions of
firms. As described above, the simulation encompasses 8760 hours of actual market data
that were aggregated into 80 representative hours, 20 for each season. These represen-
tative hourly results were then multiplied by the number of actual hours in each of the
“bins” from which these hours were based upon. The results reported below are therefore
annual totals, based upon 8760 hours of production.
Table 4 summarizes the aggregate annual CO2 emissions for each of the key regulatory
regions. Results are reported for each of the simulated scenarios, as well as the actual
(2007) aggregate emissions, as measured by CEMS, for each of these regions. First
note that simulated emissions under the “no cap” scenario are about 6% lower than
measured actual emissions. This difference is most pronounced in the California region.
As illustrated in Figure 2, these differences are driven by the relative production of
combined cycle (CCGT) to less efficient (CT and ST) gas plants. Production from
less efficient plants is lower, and from CCGT plants higher, in our simulation than in
actuality. This is most likely due to several factors. First, by aggregating actual hourly
observations into representative market hours, we in effect truncate the peak demand
levels of the system into a single level representing the average of a set of high demand
hours. The operation of these less efficient plants is usually concentrated in these very
high demand hours. Second, our simulation ignores inter-temporal operating constraints
on plants, and CCGT plants are in fact less nimble than our simulation implicitly assumes
them to be. Third, while we model major inter-regional transmission constraints, other
more local constraints could force the operation of less efficient generation.
Setting aside these differences for the moment, we turn our focus to the impacts of cap-
and-trade regulations relative to our simulated no-cap case. As would be expected, a cap
applied only to California, as originally envisioned under AB 32, would result in significant
leakage. Although California emissions decline by 5.5 mmTons as required by the cap,
aggregate west-wide emissions decline by less than one mmTon. Emissions prices are
correspondingly low, at only 10.80 $/ton, due to the fact that compliance through leakage
is a relatively inexpensive option. When the cap is applied to the currently configured
WCI, leakage is greatly reduced, but still roughly 1/3 of the 26 mmTon reduction in
WCI state emissions is picked up in the nearly 7 mmTon increase in non-WCI emissions.
When the cap is applied to the entire market, allowance prices rise to just below $ 44
/ton. This can be interpreted as the value required to reach a true reduction of 26
mmTons over the entire region without any leakage, as opposed to a reduction of 26
mmTons under the cap that is offset by an increase outside the cap. One implication
of this comprehensive carbon cap is that California emissions increase. This is because
the generation capacity inside California’s borders is relatively clean, and a west-wide
22
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Figure 2: Actual vs. Baseline Emissions
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Table 4: Scope of Regulation: Emissions by Region (mmTons)
Carbon
Regulation CA NWPP SW non-WCI Total Price
Actual (CEMS) 40.71 87.30 63.37 149.52 340.9 NA
No cap 35.99 83.75 58.00 139.46 317.2 NA
Cal only 30.55 84.78 60.04 141.25 316.62 10.80
WCI cap 32.33 71.76 46.88 147.95 298.92 40.30
WECC cap 36.87 74.32 48.99 131.08 291.26 43.80
Table 5: Change from Actual Exports by Region (Average MWh)
Regulation CA NWPP SW non-WCI
No cap 347 509 -97 -759
Cal only -969 802 468 -301
WCI cap -156 -469 -846 1472
WECC cap 1012 79 -204 -888
reduction in overall emissions is most easily accomplished by reducing output from coal
generation in other states, and replacing it with gas output from California.
Table 5 summarizes the net injections into the west-wide network originating from
each region. Recall that the “demand” modeled here is based upon actual production,
rather than end-use demand, so it is the change in these figures, summarized below,
that is relevant, rather than their absolute levels. In the table above, a negative figure
implies a net import from the region relative to the actual period, while a positive number
implies a net export. For example, California imported 347 MW per hour less under our
base-case simulation than was implied by the actual data for the same periods, resulting
in a net increase of 347 MW of CA production. Consistent with the emissions results,
one can see the sizable swing in imports into California (around 1200 MW/h) under
a California-only cap, as well as the large increase in net injections from the non-WCI
region (about 2200 MW/h) under the WCI cap. Note again that flows into California
experience a substantial decrease under the comprehensive west-wide cap.
The impact of these regulations on wholesale electricity prices in the various regions
is summarized in table 6. Note that the regional breakdown in these columns is slightly
different than in the previous tables. These are electricity market areas, rather than
24
Table 6: Scope of Regulation: Electricity Prices by Region (Average $/MWh)
Regulation Cal NWPP AZNMNV RMPA
No cap 57.14 59.12 60.44 64.89
Cal only 59.45 62.19 64.00 66.56
WCI cap 75.75 77.04 77.90 75.66
WECC cap 78.8 81.68 83.61 89.03
CO2 regulatory areas. The NWPP includes both capped and uncapped states, while
the RMPA has no WCI states in its region. Prices rise substantially under the more
comprehensive CO2 caps, even in regions not covered by the cap. This is due to the
increased exports from these regions.
5.1 Impacts of Allocation Policies
We now turn to the question of how the various policies for allocation of allowances
impacts prices and operations. Table 7 summarizes the emissions by regulatory region
for the various permutations of a policy applied to the WCI, including the baseline “no-
cap” case. In all cases, except the no-cap case, an identical emissions cap of roughly 150
mmTons, or 85% of the uncapped level, is applied to the WCI region. The row labeled
‘WCI cap” applies to any allocation policy, such as auctioning or grandfathering, where
allocations are exogenous to ongoing market outcomes. There were also two versions of
allocations through updating that we considered. The row “WCI updating” refers to
output-based updating. Under this policy, we assumed that 80%, or 120 mmTons, of the
allowances are allocated under the updating policies, with the remainder either allocated
in some exogenous fashion or auctioned off. Similarly, in the “Fuel-based” updating
scenario, we also assume that 80% of the allowances were allocated, and the remainder
auctioned. Under the Fuel-based updating scenario, we follow the CPUC’s (CPUC,
2008) proposed allocation ratios. This proposal would allocate twice as much to coal
generation as it would to gas generation. These ratios apply only to the fraction of total
allowances allocated, so that the net allocation received by a coal plant was equivalent
to 0.75 tons/MWh, while the allocation to gas plants would be 0.375 tons/MWh.21
We established these allocation levels so that the total number of allowances assigned
under both the fuel-based and output-based allocation proposals was the same. This is
truly “fuel-based” updating, with the distinction between updating being based upon
21There are very few oil plants in the sample, and they received allocations in equal ratios as those of
gas plants.
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fuel, rather than technology or explicit emissions rates. We therefore would not expect
as extreme an impact from this allocation as that implied by equation (5). However,
differentiation by fuel does capture a significant portion of the emissions rate differences
between plants, so some significant differences from output-based updating would be
expected.
As seen from Tables 7 and 8 the impacts of the allocation policies are indeed signifi-
cant. Carbon emissions in uncapped “non-WCI” regions increase by roughly 7 mmTons
(or 1/3 of the required reduction), under a WCI cap with no updating. When output-
based updating is applied to firms within the WCI, this leakage of emissions is reduced
to roughly 2 mmTons (or less than 1/10 of the required reductions). Also note that
emissions within California rise substantially with the application of output-based up-
dating. As can be seen from Figure 3, this is due to a large decrease in coal production.
This is because output-based allocation favors gas generation relative to coal-generation,
and California has no coal-based utility scale generation. The output-based updating
therefore had a non-trivial impact on mitigation of leakage from the WCI region. When
the updating approach is changed instead to be fuel-based, however, this mitigation of
leakage is largely offset. Total emissions are only 2 mmTons lower than when no updating
at all is applied.
The most striking impact of the updating policies is on the prices of the emissions
allowances. Allowance prices rise from about $ 40/ton without updating to $45.60/ton
with output-based updating. As predicted, the fuel-based updating approach has a sub-
stantial impact on allowance prices, raising them to just under $67.50/ton. Recall that
this model reflects only the electricity sector, and therefore the distortions from these
price impacts are contained within this industry and are largely offset by the updating
policies that caused them. When one considers that this market will eventually include
most major sources of CO2 emissions within the west, and be linked with other regions
through trades with other CO2 markets, as well as offset programs, the potential dis-
tortions caused by such an inflationary impact on allowance prices become a significant
concern.
The results summarized in Table 8 tell a similar story, this time in terms of energy
exports rather than emissions. The application of a CO2 cap on the WCI states results in
a net increase of 2200 MW per hour in net exports from the non-WCI regions, which swing
from net importers to net-exporters of power. When output based updating is applied,
the WCI region again becomes a net importer. As with emissions, the application of
fuel-based updating reverses the effects of output-based updating, raising net-exports
from the non-WCI regions by an average of about 700 MWh.
Table 9 summarizes the price impacts of the cap, and of the updating policies. The
imposition of the cap (again requiring a 15% reduction from the status quo) raises Cal-
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Figure 3: Impact of Updating Policies
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Table 7: Effect of Updating: Emissions by Region (mmTons)
Carbon
Regulation CA NWPP SW non-WCI Total Price
No cap 34.4 84.4 59.0 140.2 318.0 NA
WCI cap 30.9 72.0 48.2 148.8 299.9 40.30
WCI updating 38.4 65.5 47.2 141.9 293.0 45.60
Fuel-based 33.8 67.1 50.2 145.7 296.8 67.50
Table 8: Change from Actual Exports by Region (Average MWh)
Regulation CA NWPP SW non-WCI
No cap 347 509 -97 -759
WCI cap -156 -469 -846 1472
WCI updating 1169 -799 -581 210
Fuel-based 357 -684 -585 913
ifornia wholesale average prices from around $ 58/MWh to around $ 75 /MWh. The
almost $ 20 /MWh increase is consistent with the facts that CO2 costs are about $ 40
/ton in this scenario, and that gas plants, which emit roughly 1/2 ton per-MWh are
almost always the marginal, price-setting technology. When output-based updating is
applied, most of this impact on the market-clearing price is eliminated, as prices “fall”
from 75 to about $ 62 /MWh. Yet again the fuel-based updating policy reverses the
impacts of the output-based updating. Prices under fuel-based updating average around
$ 70 /MWh.
Profit Impacts of Allocation Policies
Table 9: Effect of Updating: Electricity Prices by Region (Average $/MWh)
Regulation Cal NWPP AZNMNV RMPA
No cap 57.14 59.12 60.44 64.89
WCI cap 75.75 77.04 77.9 75.66
WCI updating 62.75 65.01 66.53 68.52
Fuel-based 69.32 71.5 72.95 72.13
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We now examine how the allocation policies impact the emissions costs and operating
profits of firms. Recall that the the updating schemes are largely motivated by a desire
to offset the cost impacts to high emitting firms and limit any perceived windfalls to low
emissions firms. Table 10 summarizes the net costs of emissions regulations on firms.
The net emissions costs is defined here as the costs of emissions allowances required by
the firm under the cap-and-trade regulation less the value of the emissions allowances
allocated under the various allocation approaches. As before the fuel-based and output-
based contingent allocation schemes assume that 80% of total allowances (about 120
mmTons) are allocated to producers. The last column in this table considers an exogenous
grandfathered allocation of the same quantity, based upon the emissions under the “no-
cap” scenario, which here serves as the proxy for historic emissions.
Note that when a firm receives more in allocation than it must surrender due to
its actual emissions, the net costs can be negative. This is in fact the case for largely
gas-based producers, such as Calpine (CPN) and Dynegy (DYN) under the output-
based allocation approach. In contrast, coal-heavy producers such as PacifCorp (owned
by BRKA) and Arizona Public Service (owned by PW) have significant emissions costs
under any scenario. Despite the skewing of allowance allocation in favor of coal producers
under the fuel-based allocation approach, net emissions costs are only slightly lower for
these firms under this approach. The reason is that the higher equilibrium allowance
prices largely offset the increased allocation quantities these firms receive under the fuel-
based approach. These firms are clearly better off under grandfathering, which also skews
allocations their way without impacting allowance prices.
The picture becomes more complex when one considers the net effects of the allocation
scheme on product (electricity) prices as well as emissions costs. Table 11 summarizes
the operating profits of the firms under the assumption that each firm were selling all
its output at market-clearing prices, rather than at a a regulated cost-based rate. It is
important to recognize that several of the firms in this table are in fact either regulated or
government-owned.22 Therefore these results are more a qualitative representation of the
general net revenue and cost effects than a literal assessment of each firms bottom line
impact. The profits are therefore defined as the total revenues (assuming market-based
sales) less the net emissions costs from table 10 as well as the total production costs (fuel
and operating expenses).
The results in table 11 highlight the complex interaction between the allocation policy,
allowance prices, and electricity prices. Recall that, based on allocation and emissions
costs alone, gas-intensive firms appeared to benefit from output-based allocation. How-
ever, output-based allocation also greatly limited the pass-through of carbon costs to
22The results also reflect only revenue of sales from thermal generation sources. Firms with substantial
nuclear and hydro generation would benefit disproportionately more from a higher allowance price.
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Table 10: Net Emissions Costs by Firm (Millions $)
No Fuel- Output- Grand-
Firm Allocation based based fathering
BRKA 894.2 439.5 489.6 292.2
CPN 394.9 41.9 -96.7 126.4
DYN 261.6 6.3 -77.2 101.1
EIX 157.6 6.3 -44.1 44.3
LADWP 660.8 262.1 280.3 227.1
PW 286.4 120.5 100.4 97.8
SALTRP 341.8 135.8 123.3 110.7
SEMPRA 203.4 -0.5 -67.7 58.4
XCEL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Others 2883.3 1107.3 743.9 1261.0
electricity prices. This results in reduced revenues for all firms. While gas intensive firms
such as CPN still prefer contingent allocation to auctioning, they actually do better
under fuel-based allocation than output-based. This is despite the fact that fuel-based
allocation was intended to limit their perceived windfall benefits from allocation. How-
ever, since electricity prices are higher under fuel-based, the increased revenue from this
scenario more than offsets the reduced allocation in allowances relative to output-based
updating for these firms.
For high carbon firms, such as the coal-heavy BRKA and PW, the contingent allo-
cation approaches look even worse. The combination of higher emissions costs due to
the inflated allowance prices and lower electricity revenues reduce profits under these
allocation schemes to below those seen with no allocation at all. While fuel-based is in
fact preferred to output-based allocation by such firms, neither is particularly appealing.
As before, grandfathering is the clear winner from the perspective of such firms.
6 Conclusions
While the establishment of cap-and-trade regulation, as opposed to command-and-control
regulations, is largely motivated by a desire to provide incentives for the efficient mit-
igation of pollution, many other policy goals are often at play. These goals include
mitigating the cost impacts of climate regulation on both consumers and on the firms to
which the regulation will be applied. As climate policy advances in the United States,
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Table 11: Wholesale Market Net Revenues from Fossil Generation (Millions $)
No Fuel- Output- Grand-
Firm Allocation based based No Cap fathering
BRKA 1746 1988 1636 1587 2397
CPN 389 605 578 190 670
DYN 225 376 355 80 401
EIX 401 453 413 245 508
LADWP 442 711 535 438 899
PW 517 578 470 377 720
SALTRP 513 608 496 409 747
SEMPRA 244 338 302 91 385
XCEL 1140 1041 953 863 1140
XFRINGE 4262 4962 4168 3489 6858
these ancillary goals are playing a prominent role in the design of emissions markets.
The allocation of emissions allowances is seen as a critical tool for achieving these policy
goals.
We have studied these issues in the context of the proposed California and Western
Climate Initiative cap and trade programs, by focusing on the electricity market that
spans these regions. In this context, the mitigation of regulatory circumvention through
leakage is an additional concern. Indeed, we find that even with the expansion of the
western cap to 7 states, leakage could still be significant. Here the proposals for the
contingent allocation of allowances, either linked to the output or the fuel input of a plant,
can have a significant impact. Output-based allocation largely achieves the stated goals
of policy-makers by effectively mitigating leakage and also electricity prices. However,
when the allocation is linked to the fuel of the resource, rather than strictly to its output,
most market outcomes closely resemble those seen under an exogenous allocation scheme
such as auctioning or grandfathering. Allowance prices, however, rise considerably to
levels more than double that seen under an exogenous allocation. Although the primary
goals of input-based allocation are to insulate high-carbon firms from cost shocks and
prevent “windfalls” to low-carbon producers, these goals are largely unachieved even
when 80% of the allowances are allocated.
While we believe these results have important practical implications for the design of
the western electricity market, we need to note many caveats that limit the interpretation
of these results as a forecast of WCI cap-and-trade market results. First, we limit our
analysis to the electricity industry, which will dominate the WCI market for its first
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phase, but will then be combined with several other sectors, including transportation
fuels. Second, we model only traditional “source-based” market implementations, where
the WCI is pursuing a hybrid design that will combine the source-based regulation of
plants located within the WCI with attempts to account for the carbon content of imports
into that region.
It is important to examine the specific implications of this “first-deliverer” approach,
which will almost certainly limit leakage below the levels we find here. However, we
believe that the source based model studied here provides an accurate picture of the
implications of allocation policies under either a first-deliverer or source-based design.
There are also some factors that may limit the leakage-mitigating impact of the first-
deliverer approach. Although regulators can attempt to apply carbon levels to imports,
these attempts can be bypassed by a reshuﬄing of transactions. It is suspected that,
under such a system, relatively clean production will be identified as the ‘source’ of
imports into the WCI. Second, and more importantly, the WCI is often a net exporter of
power. The first-deliverer design cannot deal with leakage when it is driven by end-use
demand located outside the regulators jurisdiction.
When one considers the implications of an integration of the electricity sector with
other sectors, the aspect of fuel-based updating that is most problematic is the greatly
increased allowance price. The concern is that the upward price pressure from the sector
receiving updates will lead the mitigation to be concentrated in other sectors that do
not. In those sectors, marginal emissions costs will in fact be much higher than in the
sectors receiving updated allocations. For example, one would expect the utilization of
unconventional “offsets,” such allowances for retrofitting inefficient facilities, to greatly
increase as the result of the inflationary pressure on allowance prices caused by updating.
More generally, as discussions concerning national cap-and-trade regime for CO2 con-
tinue, these results, consistent with previous work, highlight the potential distortions that
updating can introduce into a cap-and-trade market. Just as important from the point
of view of policy-makers, careful attention must be paid to the equilibrium effects of any
allocation proposal. These effects can be significant if the share of allowances awarded
through updating comprise a substantial share of total allowances. In particular, the
more allocation rates are tailored to specific industries, the more the scheme takes on
characteristics of emissions-based updating. This holds the risk of greatly diluting the
beneficial effects of output-based allocation.
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